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THE PROTECTION OF “HOT NEWS”: PUTTING
BALGANESH’S “ENDURING MYTH” ABOUT
INTERNATIONAL NEWS SERVICE V. ASSOCIATED PRESS
IN PERSPECTIVE
Richard A. Epstein*
Response to: Shyamkrishna Balganesh, “Hot News”: The Enduring
Myth of Property in News, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 419 (2011).
INTRODUCTION
In his thorough and elegant article,1 Professor Shyamkrishna Balganesh
joins the many prominent writers who have cast a hard look on Justice Mahlon
Pitney’s opinion in the much mooted case of International News Service v.
Associated Press.2 Overall, Balganesh is sympathetic to Justice Pitney’s
position, which denies full property protection to what Balganesh calls “hot
news”—quite literally news that was hot off the press, in a day when we had
presses—while at the same time shielding the creators of that news from direct
competition by rival providers. On balance, I think that Balganesh reaches the
right result in his defense of International News. But we differ sharply in how
best to achieve that result.
More concretely, Balganesh takes it as his core mission to explode an
“enduring myth” that this decision enshrined an era of “property” in news,
which is good against the entire world, as most property rights are. My view is
that there is no enduring myth to dispel. I quite agree with Balganesh that the
property rights in news cannot be fit into any monolithic conception, which
assumes that all property rights are good against the world. That is the position
with respect to trespass to land, for example, where all strangers stand in the
same relationship with the owner. But that conception does not make sense in
a world where competitors and customers operate in very different niches.
* Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; Peter and Kirsten
Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution; and Senior Lecturer, The University of Chicago.
My thanks to Isaac Gruber, The University of Chicago Law School, Class of 2012, for his usual
excellent and thorough research assistance.
1. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, “Hot News”: The Enduring Myth of Property in News, 111
Colum. L. Rev. 419 (2011).
2. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
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Indeed, I have already written an extended defense of Justice Pitney’s decision
in this case that celebrates the distinctive feature that Balganesh stresses in this
article—the key role of “quasi-property,” which allows for just this
differentiation.3
In addressing this thorny question, Justice Pitney got the balance of
interests just about right. This happy verdict should come as no surprise, for I
have argued elsewhere that Justice Pitney is perhaps the most underrated
Supreme Court justice ever, especially with his astute decisions in labor law
that have suffered the sharp lash of history.4 He outdueled Justices Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. and Louis Brandeis in that arena, and the same is true of
his excellent opinion in International News, which is clearly more persuasive
than either Justice Holmes’s cryptic dissent5 or Justice Brandeis’s longer
dissent,6 opinions that I shall not discuss here. Justice Pitney’s worldview
stemmed from an uncommonly fine mind that had been well-schooled in the
principles of equitable jurisdiction throughout his time as Chancellor of the
New Jersey Supreme Court, from 1908 until his Supreme Court nomination in
1912. It was just this knowledge that makes his opinion in International News
such a bracing read.
In this short response, I hope to show that Justice Pitney’s analysis stands
well on its own terms, and need not be recast, as Balganesh purports to do,
through a novel mixture of the law dealing with misappropriation, unjust
enrichment, and restitution. To the contrary, Justice Pitney’s own striking, if
somewhat discordant, use of the notion of quasi-property well captures the
need to distinguish between use by direct competitors in the short run, which
should be frowned upon, and the use of that news by the general public, just as
Justice Pitney’s solution requires. Once the news cycle has run its course,
however, the property protection ceases against all persons, just as the term
“hot news” suggests. Justice Pitney remains the undisputed champion. There
is no myth to dispel.
In order to make out this case, I shall proceed in three parts. First, in Part
I, I shall briefly recapitulate the relevant facts in International News with an
eye toward developing the central thesis. In Part II, I shall develop the
conceptual framework that best elucidates the International News decision.
Finally in Part III, I shall critique Balganesh’s efforts to recast the decision in a
novel light.

3. Richard A. Epstein, International News Service v. Associated Press: Custom and Law as
Sources of Property Rights in News, 78 Va. L. Rev. 85 (1992) [hereinafter Epstein, INS].
4. I have discussed these at length, in Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor
Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 Yale L.J. 1357 (1983); Richard A.
Epstein, Common Law, Labor Law, and Reality: A Rejoinder to Professors Getman and Kohler,
92 Yale L.J. 1435 (1983). See, e.g., Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917)
(enforcing yellow dog contracts); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1914) (striking down a state
collective bargaining law).
5. Int’l News, 248 U.S. at 246 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
6. Int’l News, 248 U.S. at 248 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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I. THE BACKGROUND OF INTERNATIONAL NEWS
International News offers an instructive window into newsgathering
operations as they existed in the early part of the twentieth century. The suit
itself was between two rival collectives. The plaintiff, the Associated Press
(AP), had about 950 newspaper members; the defendant, the International
News Service (INS), had about 400 newspaper members.7 Each organization
had internal bylaws that allowed them to collect news that could be distributed
to each of their respective members, thereby economizing on a major cost of
newspaper publishing. In ordinary times, each organization sent its own
representatives out into the field in order to gather information for further
transmission. Once collected, the information was posted on bulletin boards
that allowed their members to use it as the basis for their own stories.
Normally, members of both organizations refrained from taking the
information from bulletin boards erected by the others, in part because of the
fear of retaliation, and in part out of respect for the internal norms of the
business. But in October and November 1916, the British and French forces
each blocked the INS from using their countries as a base for collection of the
latest news on the war, which was of course in great demand throughout the
United States.8
One distinctive feature of this ban was that it made it virtually impossible
for the AP to cooperate with the INS in the collection of information, lest it be
tarred with the same brush. Desperate for information on the war, the INS
lifted the needed information off the bulletin boards located in New York
City—and only in New York City. The INS did not rely on the AP bulletin
boards for other markets in which it retained direct access to information. The
traditional balance whereby all news services got their “tips” from rival
operations, but then investigated the stories themselves, proved stable in the
absence of this huge exogenous jolt. As a factual matter, International News is
as much about how sensible customs, reciprocally enforced, can shape the
operation of an intensely competitive industry.
Once that custom broke down, the question was how far were the INS
operatives prepared to go. Well aware of the enforceable restrictions of the
copyright law, these operatives did not copy down the information displayed
on the bulletin board word for word. Instead they distilled the necessary
information from the bulletin boards, which they used as the basis for their
own work. The system gave them a real competitive boost because, given the
three hour time differential, gathering the information early in New York
allowed for its successful use by the member newspapers located in the
western United States. The central issue in the case was whether some form of
novel property right was appropriate to fill the peculiar void in copyright law
exposed by the facts in International News. Justice Pitney’s decision offers a
creative response to that question.

7. Epstein, INS, supra note 3, at 90–91.
8. See Int’l News, 248 U.S. at 263 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (describing this problem for
INS). This is discussed in Epstein, INS, supra note 3, at 92 n.15.
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II. A DEFENSE OF JUSTICE PITNEY’S TWO-TIERED PROPERTY SYSTEM
As is commonly understood today, intellectual property law is intended to
set up property rights barricades that supplement those that are established
beyond the ordinary physical rules of trespass. It is for that reason, for
example, that the rights of privacy are invoked against defendants who
eavesdrop without trespassing on the plaintiff’s land.9 Yet, as Justice Pitney
well notes, no generalized system of property rights law could ever be allowed
to privatize information about the events of the day, which he calls publici
juris.10 Such information is incapable of ownership, just as beaches and rivers
cannot be reduced to private ownership by barring others from their use or,
with rivers and lakes, diverting their entire flow to private usages. It would be
impossible to run a competitive industry in newsgathering or publishing if the
first person to report a story had an exclusive right to report it forever after—
just imagine the melee after a presidential press conference.
The intellectual property world is well aware that information is far more
valuable if governed by an open access regime, which is why all of the current
systems of intellectual property work around a core that treats ideas and laws
of nature as part of the public space.11 Around that core, a cluster of
intellectual property rights can flourish when the desirable incentive effects for
creation outweigh any loss in the dissemination of the information in question.
Everything that Justice Pitney wrote in International News builds off this
central judgment.
Yet it hardly follows that the categories of protection for various forms of
information should be closed by the copyrights and patent law, covering
writings and inventions respectively. Most clearly, trade secrets are also a
form of property, protected under both state and federal law, and these are
created without any centralized government intervention,12 yet still receive
constitutional protection.13 Much of the law of privacy has developed to
9. The willingness to recognize wrongs short of trespass dates back to Blackstone who
condemned “eaves-droppers, or such as listen under walls and windows,” not only for what they
saw or thought but also for the “slanderous and mischievous tales” they uttered. 4 William
Blackstone, Commentaries *169. For an early modern application, see Roach v. Harper, 105
S.E.2d 564, 565 (W. Va. 1958), where the court allowed an action for invasion of privacy when
the defendant used a “hearing device” to overhear the plaintiff’s private and confidential
conversations in an apartment that he rented to her. In effect, the boundaries of the law moved
out modestly on the ground that it was easier for people not to snoop than for them to erect huge
barriers against snooping. This expansion of privacy beyond trespass had its clear analogue in the
Fourth Amendment law on searches and seizures in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967),
which held that a government tap on a public telephone booth amounted to a search or seizure
even though the electronic device did not commit a common law trespass inside the wall of the
booth.
10. Int’l News, 248 U.S. at 234 (“[T]he news element . . . is not the creation of the writer,
but is a report of matters that ordinarily are publici juris; it is the history of the day.”).
11. For patents, see Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980); for copyrights, see Feist
Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
12. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition §§ 38–45 (1995) (discussing trade
secrets). At one point, the Restatement refers to the broader notion of “trade values,” but the
usage is quickly narrowed. See id. § 38.
13. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003–04 (1984) (holding trade secrets
protected by Takings Clause).
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expand protection to individuals beyond that which they receive either from
the law of trespass as it applies to land, or the law of misappropriation as it
applies to trade names (which is itself a statutory creation). In each of these
cases, I think that the best way to analyze the problem is looking from an ex
ante perspective to see whether the creation of a new system of property rights
expands the size of the overall social pie by providing all individuals with what
I term implicit-in-kind compensation under the new intellectual property
regime that offsets the loss of use of existing assets.14 It is not, of course, the
case that Justice Pitney made an explicit reference to the more welfarist
framework, which measures the soundness of legal rules in terms of their
overall social consequences. Rather, it is that resort to this approach, I believe,
best explains the creation and expansion of different forms of property rights.
But it seems clear that his most distinctive contribution to this debate, the rise
of “quasi-property” rights between direct competitors in the newsgathering
business is very much in this tradition of thought.
To put the point most simply, what emendations to intellectual property
law should be made to deal with this case of the misappropriation, broadly
conceived, of the labor of one newsgathering association by the other? Justice
Pitney at several places refers back to the agricultural metaphor—the INS
could not properly appropriate the labor, skill, and money of the AP by
“endeavoring to reap where it has not sown,”15—that both Adam Smith16 and
William Blackstone17 used to explain why the onset of agriculture led to the
creation of permanent rights in land that were of no value in a hunter-gatherer
society. It is pointless to allow a sojourner today to keep out others in
perpetuity when he had quit the land without any clear intention to return. Yet
the exclusion right is worth ever so much more when those who clear the land
to sow know that they will stay around to reap. At this point, the projection of
property rights on the plane of time is needed to create the right incentives for
initial investment, even at the cost of excluding others. The aggregate gains
from higher production cannot be left on the table. There is, moreover, no way
in which any potential investor in land is in any position to negotiate for
exclusivity with all potential intruders. Nor is there any serious distributional
issue if the same rights of exclusion are extended to all original possessors.
Even the nonpossessors are in a far better position so long as they have the
opportunity to trade with those who own agricultural land.
Justice Pitney’s construction of quasi-property rights adapts that same
logic to hot news. Justice Pitney’s great achievement was to define a new
species of property rights in two dimensions. The first dimension is directed

14. For discussion, see Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A
Classical Liberal Response to Premature Obituary, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 455 (2010); Richard A.
Epstein, Liberty versus Property? Cracks in the Foundation of Copyright Law, 42 San Diego L.
Rev. 1 (2005). My original development of this idea took place first in connection with nuisance
law, in Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J.
Legal Stud. 49, 77–79 (1979), which then carried over to the takings law in Richard A. Epstein,
Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain (1985).
15. Int’l News, 248 U.S. at 239.
16. See generally Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence (1762).
17. 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *7.
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toward those who are excluded. It makes no sense whatsoever to say that the
AP and its affiliate papers really want to exclude their paying customers from
the use of the information that they wanted to supply. Thus, any rule that said
that the AP would agree not to use the bulletin boards of its customers if they
did not agree to use theirs, does not produce any long-run advantage for
members of either group. Quite the opposite, that move is inconsistent with
the entire economic logic of seeking to define property rights in ways that
maximize the value of information (or any other resource) by reducing the
transactional barriers to its effective utilization. But that deal—I will not
poach on your information if you do not poach on mine—when applied to
direct competitors is an effective way for both sides to avoid mutual economic
suicide. The firm that has to share information that it has acquired with others
will not collect it in the first place. That is the evident logic behind the major
growth of trade secrets, and it explains why the general policy of government
regulators is not to require, willy-nilly, those firms that submit information to
government regulatory authorities to share their hard earned gains with their
direct competitors, also seeking regulatory approval.18 The fragmentation of
protection that Justice Pitney demands makes perfectly good sense.
Next, there is the temporal dimension. On this point, it is clear that the
information’s huge value to direct competitors lies only on the day it first
appears on the bulletin board. The cycle of publication suggests that once a
day goes by, the newspapers will be looking for a new batch of information.
The previous day’s news slips into the background, and that information is
now available from countless other sources that have gotten it in the regular
fashion from the AP, INS, or a thousand other sources that have repackaged
that information in some useable form. Put these two facts together, and here
is the final blow in favor of Justice Pitney’s notion of quasi-property.
So limited to these two dimensions, the decision represents a real
sophistication in the judicial delineation of property rights in a rather
distinctive niche. To be sure, the legislature is always ready to cut back on
these kinds of new rights. But in this case, what improvements could it
possibly bring out? Indeed, the traditional history has actually gone the other
way insofar as legislation often is obtained by people who could not get
judicial recognition of a novel species of right in the first place. The efforts at
judicial innovation have in many instances borne fruit as the legislature has
done nothing to upset the rights in question. Indeed, in some cases, such as
with the fashion designs that Judge Hand rejected in Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk
Corp.,19 the courts have shown evident hostility to International News by
refusing to supply any common law protection for design patterns of short life
and great value that did not fall within the strictures of either the patent or
copyright laws.
When it came to the logic of International News, however, Judge Hand
read the case as though it stood for no general principle at all, but only applied

18. For a discussion, see generally Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Protection of
Trade Secrets Under the Takings Clause, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 57 (2004).
19. 35 F.2d 279 (1929).
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to “printed news dispatches.”20 In making that statement he further noted, as
Balganesh observed, “there are cases where the occasion is at once the
justification for, and the limit of, what is decided.”21 That sentence is fine as
far as it goes, but it does not go far enough. The real question to ask was
whether it was possible to fashion a remedy that applied only to direct
competitors within a limited time period. Cheney Bros. offered that precise
opportunity because the plaintiff only sought protection for a short-term
fashion season of eight or nine months—and then only against direct
competitors.22
Why then not use the analogical method to see whether the common law
rule that worked in the one case would work in the next? In response to this
query, Judge Hand retreated to a broader institutional argument that
recognizing these forms of protection could work at cross purposes with
established bodies of patent and copyright law. But that institutional argument
was no more decisive here than it was in International News, where it could
have also been argued that so long as the case fell outside the parameters of the
copyright law, the plaintiff had no protected interest. Yet this approach misses
the reply that any common law rule, either way, sets up only a default that the
Congress can alter given its unquestioned last word in this entire area. At this
point, the proper question is—if we should think to borrow a phrase from the
literature on preemption—whether Congress has occupied the field by its
statutes. The type of short-term limited protection sought in International
News seems far removed from the areas to which copyright protection had
already extended. The single cycle involved in both cases gives a sharp
temporal focus to a right that applies between the competitors. Judge Hand
would have done better to have taken the plunge.
Indeed, the issue is once again before Congress on the question of
whether some protection should be extended to new fashion styles that are
pirated by knock-off competitors. There is a genuine need in these cases to
walk the fine line between killing off all inspired work, on the one hand, and
allowing for massive direct imitation by exact knock-offs, on the other. The
bill currently working its way through the Senate features what resembles a
common law rule, deeming a fashion design to have not been copied from a
protected design if it “(1) is not substantially identical in overall visual
appearance to and as to the original elements of a protected design; or (2) is the
result of independent creation.”23 Oddly enough, the protection for the single
20. Id. at 280.
21. Id.; see also Balganesh, supra note 1, at 495 n.321 (quoting same passage).
22. 35 F.2d at 279–80.
23. Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act, S. 3728, 111th Cong. § 2
(2010). Opposed to this legislation are Kal Raustiala and Christopher Sprigman, who argue that
such protection is not necessary because the fashion industry has flourished under a regime of
free and easy copying. See Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox:
Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 Va. L. Rev. 1687, 1759 (2006) (noting
any “first-mover” argument in favor the current regime fails in part because “[f]or the last
quarter-century (at a minimum) the copying of fashion designs has been easy and fast”). For the
opposing point of view, see generally C. Scott Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture, and
Economics of Fashion, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 1147 (2009). For my qualified support for the latter
Hemphill-Suk position, see Richard A. Epstein, Comment to Extending Intellectual Property
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season, which was sought in Cheney Bros., may have afforded a better
solution.24 The big return on style comes in the initial year, which is worthy of
protection. But once that time passes, the style seeps into the general culture,
where it is far more costly to provide the protection to which the original
designer has a far less distinct claim.
Even if Cheney Bros. were decided the opposite way, it would still remain
the case that International News would, as a common law matter, give rise to
some close borderline cases. One such case is Judge Ralph Winter’s excellent
opinion in the National Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc.,25 where the
question was whether International News allowed the NBA to enjoin Motorola
from broadcasting a continuous feed about the progress of basketball games on
its special paid network. The case clearly involves using information
generated by another for one’s own advantage, and there is at least some
argument that greater exclusive rights to the NBA could be a larger
inducement for entering into the basketball business in the first place. But that
effect seems small at best, and is in any event a far cry from what should be
illegal: tapping into the NBA feed itself for the collection of information. But,
apart from that classic International News violation, it is rather difficult to
think of any short period in which the information could not be rebroadcast,
given the numerous outlets from which it could be provided. It is to my mind
not all that clear that Motorola does not count as a direct rival to the NBA,
which had its own reporting service. Nonetheless International News is
distinguishable because Motorola’s feeds were not simply lifted from the NBA
ones. In conscious awareness, perhaps, of the reach of that decision,
Motorola’s reports were distilled from information about the game that was
obtainable from multiple sources. The 1976 Copyright Act26 did extend to the
simultaneous reuse of broadcasted information, so the inference of occupation
of the field seems stronger than it did in International News, which did not
come close to the copyright materials. I am not as confident as Judge Winter
as to the right result, but that is neither here nor there. The decision in NBA
shows that the common law courts that created the basic doctrine of
misappropriation are capable of placing principled limitations on it.
III. THE BALGANESH APPROACH
Turning at last to the Balganesh article, his tone often seems vaguely
critical of Justice Pitney, and also, I might add, of the defense that I offered of
Justice Pitney’s opinion some twenty years ago.27 But even with the advances
Protection to the Fashion Industry, (Feb. 25, 2011, 3:31 PM), at http://ricochet.com/mainfeed/Extending-Intellectual-Property-Protection-to-the-Fashion-Industry (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
24. 35 F.2d at 279–80.
25. 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
26. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101–810 (2006)).
27. See Balganesh, supra note 1, at 452–53 (arguing International News Court “summarily
affirmed” lower court’s chosen remedy of injunctive relief “without any consideration at all”).
The gist of the criticism is that I thought that I claimed that International News “did not answer
the question of property in news,” which I thought Justice Pitney did by opting for the ingenious
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in economic theory, it is no mean feat to improve upon the original Justice
Pitney formulation. In order to carve out a position that builds on Justice
Pitney’s insights but nonetheless departs from his own conceptual framework,
Balganesh takes the position that Justice Pitney’s misappropriation theory is
best understood as a hybrid between two traditional bodies of law: unfair
competition and restitution.28
I disagree.
In fact, the distinctive features of Justice Pitney’s
misappropriation theory owe nothing to either of these bodies of law. The
common law of unfair competition draws upon two strands of the basic
libertarian theory that deal with the prohibition against force and fraud, both of
which extend the principle in a sensible fashion to transactions that involve
three parties instead of two.
To back up for a moment, the standard two-party case of fraud involves a
deceit that a defendant practices on the plaintiff, for which some remedy is
given. One such remedy is that of restitution, where the defendant has to
return the thing that he received from the plaintiff under certain contracts
vitiated by mistake so long as the plaintiff returns to the defendant his proceeds
from the transaction. Unraveling the transaction in this sense restores the
status quo for both sides.29 The use of the term restitution in this sense must
be carefully distinguished from the use of restitution as a theory of liability,
which typically depends on situations where the defendant receives some
property from the plaintiff by mistake when the transaction was not intended as
a gift. Overpayment of a bill creates the obligation to return the excess even
though there was no promise to that effect—a rationale that is explicitly
adopted as early as Gaius, in his Institutes.30
The complexities with unfair competition arise in two three-party
situations. In the first, which deals with “palming off” or, as the English say,
“passing off,” the defendant represents that his inferior wares are really the
superior wares of the plaintiff, in order to get the benefit of the plaintiff’s
reputation and hard work.31 It is, in effect, an action intended to protect
business good will.32 The action on deceit is, of course, routinely allowed to
any individual purchaser anxious to recover the small sums he has lost. But
quasi-property solution and which Balganesh appears to recognize. See Balganesh, supra note 1,
at 448 n.126 (quoting Epstein, INS, at 113–14).
28. See Balganesh, supra note 1, at 427 (“Misappropriation is thus a framework for recovery
that draws on unfair competition and unjust enrichment law, an interface that has otherwise
received little scholarly attention.”).
29. See L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1,
46 Yale L.J. 52, 56 (1936) (“[I]f A not only causes B to lose one unit but appropriates that unit to
himself, the resulting discrepancy between A and B is not one unit but two.”). For Fuller, the
restitution interest meant that the party in breach had to return what he had received from the
other side. That interest was more restricted than the reliance interest, which allowed the injured
party to recover that sum which put him back to the same position before the contract was
formed, and the expectation interest, which sought to allow the plaintiff to be put in the position
he would have been in if the contract had been fully performed.
30. 3 Gaius, Institutes of Roman Law ¶ 91 (Edward Poste, trans., 4th ed. 1904) (c. 160 AD).
31. For the statutory protection, see the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141 (2007), a
trademark statute that covers the most important cases.
32. For discussion, see generally Erven Warnink B.V. v. J. Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd.,
[1979] AC 731 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
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the larger loss is to the plaintiff-seller from the diversion of trade, even though
he is only the indirect victim of deceits practiced on others. The action is like a
quasi-class action (on behalf of consumers), which puts the real party in
interest in charge of the lawsuit. Restoration of lost profits is one remedy,
though always hard to compute. The second is an injunction against further
misconduct, which obviates the evidentiary problems.
Side by side with “palming off” is product disparagement, where the
defendant fraudulently states that the plaintiff’s product is inferior to what it
actually is, in order to make his own goods look more attractive.33 This tactic
tends to be restricted to highly concentrated markets, for otherwise the
defendant who goes to the trouble to commit fraud finds that he drives the
plaintiff’s customers into the arms of his competitors. But, either way, it is just
not possible to expect small individual buyers to bring suit for the harms that
they have suffered. The third party action allows for the same amalgamation
of the claims in the hands of the right plaintiff, as in the “palming off” case.
Neither of these provides much of a model for the novel misappropriation
theory of International News, because nothing in Justice Pitney’s formulation
of quasi-property is intended to give new actions to bulwark the common law
rules against force and fraud. To be sure, Justice Holmes did suggest in dissent
that acknowledgment of source should end the difficulties in what he regarded
as a more “subtle” and “indirect” form of palming off.34 But what good would
it do for the defendant’s members to publish a notice that some of their
information came from the AP bulletin boards, which might have the odd
effect of adding to their credibility? The key difference between these two
cases and misappropriation is that the latter depends on a notion of mutually
beneficial forced exchanges: Each side is told to give up its right to pick things
off the other’s bulletin boards for the mutual advantage of both. No hard line
libertarian theory can tolerate these forced Pareto efficient exchanges, which is
why the decision in International News represents a quantum leap beyond the
earlier cases that did fit into the force and fraud paradigm. Justice Pitney got
the point intuitively. Neither Justices Holmes nor Brandeis grasped the point.
In this regard, we can see why restitution (as the fourth wheel of the
coach)35 bears a somewhat closer resemblance to the misappropriation theory.
At its roots, restitution is also an exception to the standard libertarian view that
the only sources of obligation are promises and tortious acts. Here the
necessity of the situation creates the obligation, whereby one person is able to
force an obligation on another person solely because he has provided that party
with a benefit of equal or greater value in settings where high transactions cost
block voluntary transactions.
Yet a moment’s reflection should show that ordinary restitution and
International News involve very different forms of forced exchanges. The
traditional common law restitution case envisions a plaintiff who imposes an

33. Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 2 (1995).
34. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 247 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(“The falsehood is a little more subtle, the injury, a little more indirect . . . .”).
35. See Balganesh, supra note 1, at 428 & n.37 (quoting Richard A. Epstein, The Ubiquity
of the Benefit Principle, 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1369, 1370–71 (1994)).

2011]

The Protection of “Hot News”

89

obligation on the defendant for benefits that the plaintiff has supplied to the
defendant. As Balganesh notes, courts are normally chary about providing that
relief precisely because it deprives the defendant of the power of choice in
managing its own affairs.36 It is to prevent this officious intermeddler that the
high transaction costs condition is imposed. In other cases, the restitution
remedy is invoked where the defendant is asked to return benefits that it took
from the plaintiff. Restitution enters into the picture, if at all, only under the
doctrine of election of remedies. It has long been held, for example, that if the
defendant uses the plaintiff’s underground passages to get his coal to the
surface, the plaintiff may waive the tort and sue for damages in restitution that
the defendant obtained by using those passages without permission.37 This
theory of damages intends to make sure that the defendant cannot profit by
consciously violating the property rights of the plaintiff.
This second situation of the restitution remedy is quite remote from the
cases in which restitution furnishes the basic cause of action. It is one thing for
the defendant to be enriched by his own actions, and quite another to be
enriched by the plaintiff’s actions. The point becomes clear in this context if
only because there is no sensible way in which the plaintiff in the typical
restitution case can seek to enjoin the defendant from some future wrongful
act. The only remedy on the table is that of damages for the benefit previously
conferred under circumstances (e.g., mistake or necessity) where it is unjust for
the defendant to keep it.
Yet note the difference. The plaintiff in International News surely could
have sought injunctive relief in principle if the lifting of information from its
bulletin boards was still ongoing, which it was not. It could have also asked,
under its novel theory, for a disgorgement of profits as a remedy. But it could
not find a violation under either the copyright law or any standard libertarian
theory involving the use of force or fraud. Balganesh is right when he
surmises that “Justice Pitney may have had a purpose in using [the term quasiproperty]—especially since the term quasi-contract was for long thought to
be connected to the general principle of unjust enrichment.”38 The term
shows that there is a self-conscious deviation from the typical use of property
rights, without clearly explaining what that deviation is. It happened because
the language of forced exchanges was, and today still often is, an
unappreciated source of common law rights. But the use of the term “quasi”
does not show that the International News misappropriation tort derives from
any combination of the common law rules on unfair competition and
restitution.
Balganesh also misfires when he seeks to link up International News with
the collective action problem faced by newspapers in the newsgathering
business. A collective action problem arises when a group of individuals

36. For the basic point, see Balganesh, supra note 1, at 464 n.197 (citing Falcke v. Scottish
Imperial Ins. Co., (1886) 34 Ch.D. 234 at 248 (Eng.) (“The general principle is . . . that work or
labour done or money expended by one man to preserve or benefit the property of another do
not . . . create any obligation to repay the expenditure.”)).
37. Phillips v. Homfray, [1883] 24 Ch.D. 439 at 462 (Eng.).
38. Balganesh, supra note 1, at 439.
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acting alone are unable to achieve a result that they collectively desire.39 The
standard prisoner’s dilemma game illustrates the power of the point by
showing how each of two individuals, acting separately, has an incentive to
confess when collectively they are better off not confessing. In ordinary life it
reflects the market failures that arise when the voluntary contributions to
support national defense or the construction of local roads will lead to their
systematic underfunding, as each person seeks to free ride on the others. The
need for many newspapers to gather information is obviously enough, and
Balganesh is surely right to say that “forcing each newspaper to collect the
news individually on its own was recognized to be wasteful, duplicative, and
prohibitively expensive, for all but the largest incumbents.”40 But that is
beside the point in this context. Any association with 950 or even 400
members faces an evident collective action problem. But this collective action
was already solved long before this lawsuit began. Indeed, the very fact that
this lawsuit takes place between two such associations means that they have
already solved their collective action problems, such that the ultimate litigation
operates on the same principles that would govern a dispute between two
natural persons.
CONCLUSION
In sum, anyone who reads Balganesh’s long and carefully written article
must be impressed by his thoroughness and fair-mindedness. Yet at the same
time, it is impossible to avoid a certain uneasiness about Balganesh’s article
because it is hard to figure out precisely whether it is an effort to modernize
Justice Pitney’s decision in International News or to discredit it. My own
reading is that Balganesh is hardly dismissive of Justice Pitney and rather likes
the elegance of his solution to the problem of hot news. Yet at the same time,
he brings the wrong tools to the table to understand the case. Different tools of
analysis that understand the role of forced exchanges in defining common law
rights afford a surer path toward legitimating a decision that over the years has
received far too much uninformed criticism. Justice Pitney’s somewhat
strange and off-putting terminology of quasi-property has this virtue: It offers
a window into the inner logic of International News Service v. Associated
Press that has withstood the test of time.
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39. See, e.g., Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action 1–2 (1965) (noting “unless the
number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special
device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will
not act to achieve their common or group interests”).
40. Balganesh, supra note 1, at 449.

